Collaborative approaches to network defense are increasingly used to predict and speed up detection of attacks. In this paper, we focus on highly predictive blacklisting, i.e., forecasting attack sources based on alerts contributed by multiple organizations. While collaboration allows to discover groups of correlated attacks targeting similar victims, it also raises important security and privacy challenges. We propose a scalable privacyfriendly system, featuring a semi-trusted authority that clusters organizations based on the similarity of their logs. Entities in the same cluster then securely share relevant logs and can build more accurate predictive blacklists. We present an extensive set of measurements using real-world alerts from DShield.org and show that available centralized algorithms for predictive blacklisting actually achieve poor accuracy as they increase the number of false positives and negatives. Then, we demonstrate that minimizing/optimizing information shared across organizations improves the quality of predictions as privacy protection does not actually limit this improvement. In fact, our methods markedly outperform non privacypreserving tools both in terms of precision and recall.
Introduction
A common defense practice to reduce the number and the impact of cyber attacks is to filter connections from/to hosts that are classified as suspicious or outright malicious. Due to the impossibility of performing "expensive" real-time computations (e.g., classification) on each request, filtering can really only be done based on lookups against periodically updated lists of suspicious hosts, commonly referred to as blacklists. Naturally, this motivates the need to improve the accuracy of the blacklists as well as the speed and the effectiveness of their updates. Highly Predictive Blacklisting. There are two basic approaches to building blacklists: (1) periodically create a local blacklist based on one's own data and/or (2) rely on lists formulated by large-scale alert repositories (e.g., DShield.org, myNetWatchman [1], Symantec DeepSight [37] , etc.) consisting of the most prolific attack sources. Zhang et al. [39] denote these two approaches, respectively, as local and global worst offender lists (LWOL/GWOL), highlighting how the latter misses a significant number of attacks as sources may choose their targets strategically, while the former is completely reactive. Consequently, they introduce the notion of highly predictive blacklisting, whereby different entities contribute their logs to a central authority, which, in turn, returns customized blacklists based on relevance ranking, or, in follow-up work, on implicit recommendation [36] .
Collaborative Security vs Privacy? In general, collaborative approaches to threat mitigation, beyond predictive blacklisting, are being increasingly advocated, both in the public and the private sector. Efforts to promote information sharing are proliferating, including, e.g., initiatives from the White House [38] , CERT [6] , the RedSky Alliance [33] , Facebook ThreatExchange [2] , etc. However, information sharing prompts important privacy concerns, and organizations are often reluctant to share their intelligence, due not only to confidentiality reasons, but also trust, liability, and competitiveness concerns. Even sharing firewall logs can reveal sensitive information that could damage an organization's reputation -e.g., disclosing that they have been late to apply security patches or leaking information about their customers or business practices [3, 8] .
This motivates the need for privacy-friendly approaches to collaborative predictive blacklisting. Porras and Shmatikov [32] use data anonymization and sanitization to address privacy concerns in large-scale collection of security data, while Freudiger et al. [16] explore which pairwise metrics could be used by two organizations to decide whether or not they should share security data with each other. However, data sanitization reduces data utility and is anyway prone to deanonymization [10] , while [16] 's peer-to-peer approach obviously does not scale to many organizations. Moreover, prior work [21, 36, 39] does show that central repositories can uncover groups of correlated attackers targeting groups of correlated victims -e.g., Soldo et al. [36] claim that their centralized algorithm can capture attacker-victim history as well as attackers and/or victims interactions (using neighborhood models), and can significantly improve the prediction rate.
Technical Roadmap
Motivated to address this apparent "tension" between security and privacy, we set to investigate how to enhance accuracy of predictive blacklists by letting organizations collaborate with each other, while minimizing the amount of information they disclose in the process.
First, however, we take a closer look at existing non privacy-preserving tools [36, 39] and notice that prior work only focused on measuring the improvement in successfully predicted attacks (i.e., true positives), but actually overlooked incorrect predictions (i.e., false positives and negatives). Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the state of the art [36] actually yields a very large number of false positives and negatives, thus, achieving very low precision (0.08) and a recall (0.66) that does not reflect the improvement in true positives compared to predicting based on local logs only. In fact, accuracy -measured as per F 1 score -is actually lower than if organizations performed prediction independently (0.14 vs 0.26). This shows that access to more data does not necessarily imply better predictions, suggesting that privacy-friendly highly predictive blacklisting may be feasible by minimizing/optimizing information disclosed by collaborating organizations.
We then introduce a novel scalable and privacyfriendly approach that relies on a semi-trusted authority, or STA, acting as a coordinating entity to facilitate clustering without having access to the raw data. Specifically, STA clusters contributors based on the similarity of their logs (without seeing these logs), and helps organizations in the same cluster securely share relevant logs. Toward this goal, we investigate (i) how to cluster organizations, and (ii) what should be shared among them. We experiment with four clustering algorithms -agglomerative clustering, k-means, k-NN, and DBSCAN -relying on the number of common attacks as a measure of similarity, which is computed in a privacy-preserving way. Then, we experiment with privacy-friendly within-clusters sharing strategies: only disclosing the details of common attacks and/or discovering correlated attacks (again, privately).
We present the result of a comprehensive measurement analysis based on alerts obtained from DShield.org, involving 70 organizations reporting an average of 4,000 daily events, over a 15-day time window (although experiments on other periods yield similar results). For each clustering algorithm considered, and for each log sharing strategy, we compare the performance in terms of True Positive Rate (recall), precision, and F 1 score, as well as the increase in True Positives, False Positives, and False Negatives as a result of collaboration (i.e., comparing to a local baseline prediction). We observe that different clustering algorithms exhibit different behaviors, e.g., fluctuations are observed in the average improvement with some organizations benefiting more than others. We demonstrate that controlled data sharing helps organizations forecast attacks, compared to performing predictions locally. Sharing common attacks between organizations, and then combining this information with events from previously unseen attackers that have clusterwide correlation, maximizes the number of attacks predicted but also introduces more false positives.
Overall, we show that our privacy-friendly techniques markedly outperform existing (non privacy-preserving) algorithms for highly predictive blacklisting [36] in both precision and recall, demonstrating that our approach not only minimizes information exposure but also results in better predictions. Specifically, we obtain a maximum 0.84 recall, 0.23 precision, and 0.36 F 1 score, compared to, respectively, 0.66, 0.08, 0.14 from [36] . Finally, we demonstrate that our system can efficiently scale to large numbers of organizations and large datasets.
Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews related work, then, Section 3 introduces the datasets and the metrics used in our experiments. After presenting an experimental evaluation of Soldo et al. [36] 's techniques in Section 4, Section 5 introduces a novel privacy-friendly approach to highly predictive blacklisting. Section 6 presents an extension that enhances its scalability and a performance evaluation. Finally, the paper concludes in Section 7.
Related Work
Katti et al. [21] are among the first to measure correlated attacks -i.e., attacks mounted by the same sources against different networks -establishing that they are very common yet highly targeted. They show that attack correlation persists over time and suggest that realtime collaboration between victims could significantly improve malicious IP detection time.
In [39] , Zhang et al. introduce highly predictive blacklisting, having different organizations contribute alerts to a central repository such as DShield.org, which in turn provides them with daily personalized (predictive) blacklists. The prediction uses a relevance ranking scheme similar to PageRank, measuring the correlation of an attacker to a contributor based on their history as well as the attacker's recent log production patterns. Then, Soldo et al. [36] improve on [39] using an implicit recommendation system to discover similar victims as well as groups of correlated victims and attackers. In their model, the presence of attacks performed by the same source around the same time leads to stronger similarity among victims, and a neighborhood model (k-NN) is applied to find clusters of similar victims. A co-clustering technique, Cross Association (CA) [7] , is then used to discover groups of correlated attackers and victims, and prediction within the cluster is done via a time-series algorithm -Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) -capturing attacks' temporal trends.
Meng et al [27] present a comprehensive survey highlighting the essential components, and the challenges, of collaborative security. The survey analyzes three key factors of collaborative intrusion detection, namely, communication, robustness, and privacy, arguing besides efficient and scalable communication, mechanisms for robustness (i.e., resilience to insider attacks) and privacy should be carefully considered.
Felegyhazi et al. [14] perform proactive prediction of malicious domain use: starting from some seeds (e.g., confirmed bad domains), they predict clusters of related domains based on name server features (zone files containing subdomains and authoritative name servers), and infer new bad domains. Then, Liu et al. [25] , based on externally observable properties of an organization's network, aim to predict breaches without the organization's cooperation. The system collects features about the organization's network (e.g., misconfigured DNS or BGP entries within a network, spam, phishing, etc.) and uses these features to train a Random Forest classifier.
Finally, Sirivianos et al. [35] propose a collaborative system that enables hosts with no email classification functionality to check whether a host is a spammer or not. Each host then assesses the trustworthiness of spam reporters by auditing their reports and leveraging the social network of the reporters' administrators. Whereas, Moura et al. [28] evaluate how network administrators can leverage different "bad neighborhood blacklists" (i.e., malicious hosts concentrated in certain portions of the IP address space which often correspond to poorly managed networks) generated by third-party sources to detect spam messages, and observe a significantly large intersection between third-party blacklists.
Porras and Shmatikov [32] are the first to discuss privacy risks prompted by sharing security-related data and propose data anonymization and sanitization to address them. However, follow-up work [10, 24] demonstrates that these techniques make data less useful and anyway prone to de-anonymization. Burkhart et al. [5] introduce a few privacy-preserving protocols based on secure multiparty computation (MPC) for aggregation of network statistics. This is also explored in [4] where entities send encrypted data to a central repository that aggregates contributions. However, statistics only identify most prolific attack sources and yield global models, which, as discussed in [39] , miss a significant number of attacks and yield poor prediction performance. Nagaraja et al. [29] propose an inference algorithm, BotGrep, geared to discover botnet hosts and links in network traffics by identifying structured topologies, and partially rely on privacy-preserving algorithms, such as Private Set Intersection [12] .
Freudiger et al. [16] investigate the feasibility of privacy-friendly collaborative threat mitigation: rather than building an actual system, they merely focus on identifying which metrics (e.g., number of common attacks, dataset similarity) could be used to privately estimate the benefits of collaboration between two organizations and show that only sharing information about common attacks already significantly improves true positives.
Preliminaries
This section presents the data used in our experiments as well as some important preliminary information.
Dataset
Aiming to design a meaningful measurement-based analysis of highly predictive blacklisting, we gather a dataset of blacklisted IP addresses from DShield.org, as done in previous work [16, 36, 39] . DShield is a collaborative firewall log correlation system to which various organizations volunteer daily alerts. Each entry in the logs consists of a pseudonymized Contributor ID (the target), the source IP address (the attacker), source and target port number, and the timestamp.
An example of an entry log is illustrated in Crawling. With DShield's permission, we have been collecting daily logs using a JavaScript web crawler, gathering, on average, 10 million logs from 120,000 organizations every day. We exclude entries for invalid, non-routable, or unassigned IP addresses, and discard port numbers. Then, for each IP address, we extract its /24 subnet and use /24 addresses for all experiments. Note that this does not necessarily mean that predictive blacklisting algorithms will blacklist entire /24 subnets: this is an experimental choice also made by previous work [36, 39] , as the main research goal is to compare the impact of different approaches on prediction. Moreover, blacklisting an address does not imply blocking all its traffic, but rather subject it to further scrutiny, e.g., enforcing rate limiting or allowing outgoing packets only.
Dataset. To facilitate our experiments, we select a 15-day period, May 17-31, 2015 and restrict our evaluations to a reasonably-sized sample of regularly contributing organizations. We select the top-100 daily contributors that report logs every day during the 15 days. We then plot the number of logs contributed by each of the 100 organizations during each 6-day time window between May 17-31, 2015. As illustrated in Figure 1 , most contributors (around 60) submit less than 100K logs, while fewer (around 20) submit between 100K and 500K, and only a handful of organizations contribute very large amounts of logs (above 1M). Then, we pick 70 organizations, for each time window, by sampling from the middle, i.e., we leave out the top-10 and the bottom-20 contributors. We do so in order to avoid biases which could be introduced if we only focused on top contributors, since these often contribute one order of magnitude more alerts than the average top-100.
Our final sample dataset includes 30 million attacks, contributed by 118 different organizations over 15 days, each reporting a daily average of 600 suspicious (unique) IPs and 4,000 attack events.
Training and Testing Sets. We use the DShield dataset both as a training set and a testing set (i.e., ground truth). Specifically, we consider a sliding window of 5 days for training and 1 day for testing, as done in [36] . Note: We have repeated all our experiments on two more sets of DShield logs, extracted, respectively, from 15-day periods between February 13-27, 2015 and December 1-15, 2015, but have not found any significant difference in the results, therefore, we limit the discussion of our experimental results to May 17-31.
Notation
We assume a group of n organizations O = {O i } n i=1 , where each organization O i holds a dataset D i of alerts, i.e., suspicious IP addresses along with the related timestamp. We aim to predict IP addresses that may generate attacks to each O i in the next day, using, as the training set, both its local dataset D i , as well the set D i , with suspicious IP addresses obtained by collaborating with other organizations. As discussed above, we consider n = 70 organizations using alerts collected from DShield.
EWMA Time Series Prediction
As in previous work [36] , we rely on the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) algorithm to perform prediction. Given a signal over time r(t), we indicate withr(t + 1) the predicted value of r(t + 1), given past observations r(t ) at time t ≤ t. The predicted signal is computed as:
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing coefficient, t = 1, . . . , t denotes the training window, and t + 1 is the time slot to be predicted. For small values of α, EWMA aggregates past information uniformly across the training window in order to perform the prediction. On the contrary, using a large value of α, the prediction algorithm focuses more on events taking place in the recent past.
Metrics
Throughout our evaluations, we use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of the predictions. True and False Positives. For each time window and for each organization, we count True Positives (T P ) as well as False Positives (F P ). A T P occurs when the prediction algorithm includes an IP address in an organization's predictive blacklist that does appear in its testing set, and a F P -when it does not. False Negatives. For each time window/organization, we generate predictive whitelists, i.e., sets of IP addresses that are not likely to attack an organization the next day, and count a False Negative (F N ) when a whitelisted IP address instead appears in the testing set. TP Improvement and FP/FN Increase. We also measure the average improvement/increase in T P , F P , and F N when compared to a baseline local approach, i.e., when no collaboration occurs between organizations and each of them makes its predictions based only on its local dataset. The improvement in T P is calculated as: T P impr = (T P c − T P )/T P where T P c is the number of true positives after collaboration and T P without. Similarly, the increase in F P and F N is denoted, resp., as
Precision, Recall, F1-Score. We calculate the True Positive Rate (T P R), aka recall, as well as Positive Predictive Value (P P V ), aka precision, defined as:
and derive the F1 score:
Remarks on FP: Due to the nature of our dataset, the absence of an IP from the testing set occurs either when the IP is not considered suspicious or it does not generate requests. While we cannot actually distinguish between the two cases, in the latter a F P is actually less "severe" than in the former. However, as our main goal is to measure/compare the impact of different algorithms on predictions, it is not very important for us to distinguish. Also note that non-negligible F P rates do not necessarily imply that organizations would block a lot of "innocent" traffic. Blacklisting does not actually mean denying all traffic, rather, a blacklisted IP is subject to further scrutiny-e.g., a firewall could enforce rate limiting, only allowing outgoing packets, denying connections to certain ports or on certain protocols, etc.
Evaluating Existing Predictive Blacklisting Approaches
We now present an experimental evaluation of the implicit recommendation based approach for highly predictive blacklisting proposed by Soldo et al [36] . We have re-implemented their system, as described in [36] , in Python and used Chakrabarti's implementation 1 of the Cross Association (CA) algorithm discussed in [7] .
We evaluate [36] 's performance over our DShield dataset from Section 3.1: we start by measuring, as a baseline, the basic predictor which only relies on a local EWMA time series algorithm (TS), using α = 0.9 as it yields the best results. Then, we apply their coclustering techniques, performing TS on clusters of correlated attackers and victims (TS-CA), and, finally, implement their full scheme by combining k-NN to cluster victims based on their similarity with CA and TS (TS-CA-k-NN). Figure 2 illustrates the improvement/increase in T P , F P , F N (compared to the TS baseline) as well as T P R, P P V , and F 1, with various k values (ranging from 1 to 35) used by the k-NN algorithm to discover similar organizations. Obviously the k-NN parameter k does not affect TS-CA and TS.
Figure 2(a) shows that, with TS-CA-k-NN, the number of T P improve significantly as k increases, almost doubling the "hit count" compared to the TS baseline, whereas, TS-CA improves less (0.67). On the other hand, however, F P increase too, 5-to 50-fold, as clusters become bigger (Figure 2 Interestingly, the T P increase does not correspond to a comparable increase in T P R due to the poor F N performance, as shown by the fact that TS-CA-k-NN reaches 0.95 in T P impr but only at most 0.66 T P R compared to 0.59 with the baseline TS. Overall, Soldo et al.'s techniques achieve poor F1 scores, showing that their approach does not perform well in practice as TS-CA and TS-CA-k-NN yield lower F1 scores (at most 0.16 and 0.14, respectively) than a simple local time-series prediction (0.26).
Private Highly Predictive Blacklisting

Model
Our system aims to support private computation of highly predictive blacklisting, so that organizations with limited mutual trust can collaborate and enhance the prediction of future attacks, while only the minimum amount of information is disclosed in the process. We assume the presence of a semi-trusted authority, namely STA, which acts as a coordinating entity between the organizations, but does not have access to data in the clear. In practice, STA could be run by DShield, CERT [6] , or an ad-hoc cloud-based service, assisting organizations in the same sector and/or locations (e.g., universities, small businesses, etc.). We rely on STA to perform clustering, i.e., identifying organizations that are targeted by similar attackers, based on a pairwise similarity matrix, which we denote as the O2O (organization-to-organization) matrix, to be computed privately. Once organizations have been assigned to clusters, they share information. Specifically, the system involves the following steps, presented next:
1. Organizations compute, privately, a pairwise similarity measure, used by STA to build an organization-to-organization matrix, O2O; 2. STA clusters organizations based on O2O; 3. Organizations share, in a privacy-preserving way, data with other organizations in their cluster; 4. Organizations perform the prediction based on their "enhanced" datasets. We assume that STA is a semi-trusted authority that does not collude with any organization to violate privacy of other parties. We also assume that all the parties follow the protocol specifications. (We refer to Appendix A for more details on the adversarial model.)
Organization-to-Organization Similarity
In order to cluster together organizations that are targeted by similar attackers, we use a similarity measure to be computed between each pair of organizations
We consider a few approaches:
• The cardinality of the set intersection, |D i ∩ D j |, i.e., the number of common attacks. Note that the intersection is between multi-sets, so if the same IP appears twice in both parties' logs in the same day, it is counted twice in the intersection;
• Cosine similarity, assuming datasets have size m:
• Pearson Correlation, assuming datasets have size m:
We have evaluated the four approaches above experimentally and have observed that using cardinality of set intersection yields the best results overall in terms of precision and recall. Especially, Pearson Correlation and cosine similarity do not produce good overall performances (in terms of T P R and P P V ). Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we only focus on the cardinality of set intersection as a pairwise similarity measure between organizations. Note that, to support private preserving computation of set intersection cardinality, we can use Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) [11] (reviewed in Appendix A). In Section 6, we also introduce a server-aided variant that reduces complexity by minimizing publickey cryptography operations, thus guaranteeing full scalability for large numbers of organizations.
Clustering
The next step is for the STA authority to perform clustering based on the O2O matrix. For this task, we consider four clustering algorithms -namely, agglomerative clustering, k-means, k-NN, and DBSCAN -which use different approaches to discover groups of similar organizations. As discussed above, entries in the O2O matrix are similarity measures between two organizations, defined as the number of IP addresses attacking them both over a given time window.
To ease presentation, we defer to Appendix B the review of the clustering algorithms.
Log Sharing
Next, STA reports to each organization the identity of other organizations in the same cluster (if any), so that they collaboratively (yet privately) share logs to boost the accuracy of their prediction. Below, we consider a few possible strategies to share information.
Common Attacks (Intersection). Each organization in the cluster only shares logs corresponding to common attackers. Specifically, if an attacker is common for two organizations, these organizations share the events from their datasets related to this IP address. As a result, each entity enhances its local dataset with additional events about an attacker that have been witnessed by the rest of the contributors in its cluster, thus reinforcing the knowledge about that attacker. Privately sharing information about common attacks is possible via secure multiparty computation, using the Private Set Intersection with Data Transfer primitive (PSI-DT) [12] (reviewed in Appendix A). Again, Section 6 shows how to rely on a server-aided variant to achieve scalability in the presence of many organizations.
Correlated Attacks (IP2IP). We also consider letting organizations in the same cluster identify correlations between attackers, by building a matrix of co-occurrences of attack sources. We aim to capture correlations between attackers that cannot be discovered based on the individual logs of each contributor, or using the common attacks approach discussed above. More specifically, a symmetric matrix -which we denote as IP2IP matrix -is built to store the number of co-occurrences for each pair of attackers, and a clustering algorithm such as k-NN is run to find correlated attacks.
To perform this task in an efficient and privacypreserving way, we rely on the protocols proposed by Melis et al. [26] -also reviewed in Appendix A -for privacy-preserving Item-KNN using Count-Min sketches [9] . Each organization in a cluster encrypts and transmits a succinct representation of their matrix in such a way that STA can only decrypt the aggregate matrix. Despite an upper-bounded error in the aggregate is introduced due to the succinct data representation, the communication and computational overheads incurred by the cryptographic operations are reduced from linear to logarithmic in the size of the IP2IP matrix. Once the STA obtains the aggregate IP2IP matrix, it runs the Item-KNN algorithm, finds correlated attacks, and communicate them to organizations in the same cluster.
Common & Correlated Attacks (IP2IP+intersection).
Obviously the two strategies discussed above can also be combined, so that cluster contributors can benefit from sharing their intersection (i.e., obtaining more events on attackers that already exist in their training set) as well as obtaining events from previously unseen attackers that have cluster-wide correlation.
Baseline (Local). We will also consider a baseline approach whereby each organization does not share any information with any other entity, i.e., making predictions based only on its local logs.
Sharing Everything (Global). For the sake of our experiments, we also measure a global approach whereby all contributors in the cluster share everything with each other. While we expect this approach to provide the highest degree of intelligence to the organizations, some of the information may be irrelevant to some contributors, yielding a high number of false positives/negatives. As we use this approach simply for comparison, we do not take into account privacy protection.
Attacks Prediction
In order to model the temporal dynamics of the attacks, we use a time series approach, namely Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA, cf. Section 3.3), as [36] showed that, for the large majority of attacking IP addresses, future activity strongly depends on the recent past. EWMA predicts future values based on past values weighted with exponentially decreasing weights towards older values.
Specifically, for each organization u and for each attacker a on its training set, r a,u (t ) denotes a binary value indicating whether or not a attacked u at time t . EWMA aggregates these signals from the training set and outputs a measure of how likely a is going to attack u again. When collaboration takes place, the training set of each organization is augmented with additional logs and events coming from the entities in its cluster. Using this "enhanced" training set, the organization trains the EWMA algorithm and creates augmented blacklists. Once again, we set α = 0.9 as it yields the best results.
Comparing Clustering and Log Sharing Strategies
We now present the results of an extensive experimental evaluation comparing how different clustering (agglomerative, k-NN, k-means, DBSCAN) and sharing approaches (intersection, IP2IP, IP2IP+intersection) affect the performance of the predictive blacklisting, and compare to local (no sharing) and global (sharing everything) baselines. Our experiments are written in Python, using the scikit-learn machine learning suite [30] , and will be made available with the final version of the paper.
Settings. Throughout our experiments, we use notation and parameters introduced in Section 3, i.e., we consider 70 organizations using alerts collected from DShield in a 15-day period between May 17-31, 2015. Also, for the IP2IP method, we only consider the top-1000 attackers (i.e., the top-1000 heavy hitters) in each cluster, for each 5-day training-set window, rather than looking for correlations over all the /24 IP space. Note that this is only done to speed up our experiments, whereas, we can actually use the Count-Min sketch based private aggregation protocols from [26] to efficiently support k-NN computation, privately, over all the 2 24 addresses. In fact, the succinct representation of the IP2IP matrix uses a sketch of size O(log(2 24 · 2 24 )): specifically, given parameters ( , δ), we get a matrix of size L = d × w where d = ln (2 24 · 2 24 )/(2 * δ) and w = e/ . Setting = δ = 0.01 [26] , the Count-Min sketch size amounts to L = 10, 336, yielding practical computational/communication overhead.
Finally, we fix the k value for the k-NN based recommendation to 50, as it provides the best results in our experiments.
Agglomerative Clustering
We consider different numbers of desired clusters (k), ranging from 1 to 35, setting affinity and linkage parameters to cosine and average, respectively, to indicate what distance measures to use between sets of observations. For k > 15, the size of the cluster slowly reaches 2 (see Appendix C for more details). As each organization is assigned to exactly one cluster, in each time window, all 70 organizations are involved in collaborations.
In Figures 3(a)-3(c) , we plot average T P impr , F P incr , and F N incr , respectively, with increasing number of clusters.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, IP2IP achieves smaller T P impr results (at most 0.20) than global (up to 1.10), which however incurs higher F N incr (0.3) and above all F P incr (1000). We also note that T P impr presents a relatively large standard deviation for all cluster sizes, indicating that there are a few organizations that benefit from collaboration much more than others.
Figure 3(d) shows that recall (T P R) always improves when sharing, with intersection reaching 0.76. When combining intersection and IP2IP, T P R slowly degrades with smaller clusters (peaks at 0.68 for k = 5), while, with IP2IP, it increases (0.67 for k = 35). Because of the increase in F N , global performs worse in terms of recall (0.66) although obtaining the best T P impr .
From Figure 3 (e) we observe that local yields the best performances in terms of precision (0.16), followed by intersection (0.15, slightly growing for larger k), while IP2IP and IP2IP+intersection slowly increase up to 0.13. Global performs poorly overall (up to 0.04) due to its large number of F P . Finally, Figure 3 (f) plots the F 1 score: intersection achieves slightly better scores than local (0.26 vs 0.25), while its combination with IP2IP, or just IP2IP are slightly worse (0.22).
k-means
Next, we use k-means for clustering and obtain results similar to agglomerative clustering. Thus, we decide to restrict to stronger correlations, by only taking into account organizations closer to the cluster's centroid, and excluding the rest of them as outliers. We set a distance threshold and experiment with it empirically, finding that the optimal setting is the 40th percentile, i.e., the cluster distance value below which 40% of the organizations can be found. With growing values of k (ranging from 1 to 35), the algorithm produces more and smaller clusters, and more organizations collaborate (see Appendix C).
Figures 4(a)-4(c) plot the average improvement in T P and increase in F P and F N , respectively. T P impr is somewhat constant with IP2IP (0.2) independent of the cluster sizes, while with the other methods it decreases faster due to the distance thresholds, ranging from 1.1 with global for k = 1 to 0.1 of intersection for k = 35. IP2IP shows steady F N incr values compared to other methods (−0.2, i.e., a 20% decrease) which leads to a better performance in T P R, as shown in Figure 4 k ≥ 10 (up to 0.71). Furthermore, intersection yields the best performance in F N incr (−0.52), with k = 1. Figure 4 (f) shows the best F 1 score (0.30) is reached using intersection with k = 5, due to a peak both in P P V and T P R. IP2IP performs slightly worse (0.23) than local (0.28) while poor F 1 values for global, with k = 35, (0.18) are due to its bad P P V (0.10) -see Figure 4 (e).
k-NN
Recall that, in k-NN, the parameter k indicates the number of nearest neighbors that each entity considers as its most similar ones. Thus, organizations can end up in more than one neighborhood (unlike agglomerative clustering or k-means). Since the algorithm builds a neighborhood for each organization, not all clusters have the same strength. Therefore, we only consider strong clusters in terms of their members similarity and as done with k-means, we set a distance threshold as the 40th percentile to leave possible outliers out of the clusters.
As k increases, so do cluster sizes, ranging from 1 to 14, and the algorithm builds on average 25 strong clusters in each time window. Note that for k = 1 all organizations are involved in exactly one cluster of size 1, since k-NN identifies them as their own nearest neighbor. Other than this special case, as we focus on strong clusters and set a distance threshold, the system makes fewer organizations collaborate overall (ranging from 220 with k = 5 to 320 with k = 35).(See Appendix C for cluster sizes and the number of collaborators involved.)
From Figure 5 (a), we observe that IP2IP+intersection yields the second best performance in T P impr (0.38, with k = 35), while global peaks at 0.60. Interestingly, the standard deviation of T P impr is much smaller than with other clustering algorithms, indicating that, due to overlapping clusters, "big" contributors can help a lot "smaller" ones, as they are involved in multiple clusters, thus, improvements are more uniformly distributed over the contributors that are involved in collaboration. In terms of F P incr , IP2IP doubles the number of F P (for k = 35), while intersection achieves the lowest value with 0.51 (again, for k = 35). As with previous clustering algorithms, we notice that intersection yields the best decrease in F N , i.e., −0.5 with k = 35.
Intersection also achieves the highest T P R (up to 0.77) with larger cluster sizes (i.e., for k ≥ 10), while its combination with the IP2IP reduces it (0.71) -see Figure 5 (d). Figure 5 (e) shows that intersection has the best P P V too (0.19 for k = 15), similar to local (0.18), while IP2IP performs worse (0.16) due to higher F P incr (almost doubling the F P for k = 35). 
DBSCAN
Our last set of experiments are with DBSCAN: unlike the other clustering algorithms, this does not take the number of clusters as an input parameter, but relies on a threshold, eps, to define the maximum distance such that two samples are considered to be in the same neighborhood. For each time window, after tuning the parameter eps, the algorithm produces between 1 and 3 clusters. As the total number of collaborators range from 50 to 210 (out of the total 700), we conclude that the algorithm identifies a lot of outliers, i.e., organizations that are left out of the clusters, and results in the most "conservative" collaboration setting.
From Figure 6 (a), we observe that the best T P impr is produced when the algorithm builds 2 clusters. In this case, IP2IP+intersection achieves, on average, up to 0.70 T P impr but with a relatively high F P incr (5.86). We also look at (but do not plot) the T P impr for every organization and notice that, with 2 clusters, there is one organization that improves dramatically more, while this does not happen when the algorithm builds 1 or 3 clusters. This fact highlights how, in certain settings, the benefits of collaboration are not so well distributed. Moreover, in Figures 6(b) and 6(c), we observe that for all sharing methods, F P incr and F N incr are rather steady and independent of the cluster sizes. Intersection achieves the lowest F P incr (up to 0.8) and biggest decrease in F N (−0.45), which explains its overall good performance in terms of P P V and T P R respectively.
More precisely, Figure 6 (d) illustrates how the algorithm behaves in terms of T P R for different number of clusters, with better results when building 1 cluster of 33 contributors or 3 clusters of 16 contributors on average, rather than 2 clusters of 22 collaborators as in T P impr (up to 0.74 for IP2IP+intersection). As for precision ( Figure 6(e) ), intersection shows a similar behavior to local (0.23), as with the other clustering algorithms, with worse P P V for IP2IP (0.11). Finally, Figure 6 (f) plots the F1 score, with intersection achieving the best result of 0.36 when one cluster is built. The F 1 scores for IP2IP, and its combination with intersection, are both steady around 0.2. Table 3 : Best Cases of our Experiments for T P R. Table 4 : Best Cases of our Experiments for P P V . Table 5 : Best Cases of our Experiments for T Pimpr.
Discussion
We now analyze the results of our experimental analysis and highlight a few interesting observations. Summary of Results. We summarize the best results for each clustering algorithm, in terms of F 1, recall, precision, and T P impr respectively, in Tables 2-5. Note that intersection is that sharing mechanism that maximizes all metrics, except for T P impr , which is instead maximized with IP2IP+intersection.
We observe that DBSCAN always yields the best performance, in terms of F 1 (0.36), however, with one single cluster of 33 contributors, thus, only a relatively small fraction of organizations (4%) benefit from collaboration. Whereas, agglomerative clustering involves all 700 contributors and achieves F 1 = 0.27. Both k-means and k-NN yield 0.30 in F 1 including, respectively, 280 and 240 collaborators.
Similarly, DBSCAN with one cluster yields the best results for T P R (0.84) and P P V (0.23) as shown in Tables 3-4. However, other collaboration settings include many more organizations with comparable results, e.g., k-NN with k = 35 and 320 collaborators achieves only 7% lower T P R (0.77), while k-means with k = 15 and 280 collaborators yields a 0.19 in P P V . In terms of T P impr , DBSCAN reaches a maximum of 0.74 when it builds 2 clusters of size 21.1 on average, selecting 210 collaborators overall. Once again, slightly lower improvements are achieved with other clustering algorithms, but with more collaborators benefiting from sharing, as well as fewer F P .
Data sharing always helps organizations forecast attacks, compared to performing predictions locally. Somewhat unsurprisingly, predicting based on all data from collaborators yields the highest improvement in T P impr -especially for bigger clusters -but with a dramatic increase in F P incr . When organizations share correlated attacks (IP2IP), we observe a steady T P impr , while sharing common attacks (intersection) outperforms the former when bigger clusters are formed. However, intersection introduces lower F P incr , ultimately leading to better precision and F 1 scores.
IP2IP+intersection always outperforms the two separate methods in terms of T P impr , thus, it is the recommended strategy if one only wants to maximize the number of predicted attacks -see Table 5 . Impact of cluster size. With agglomerative clustering, each organization is assigned to exactly one cluster and thus participates in/benefits from collaboration. We observe higher T P R for bigger clusters and, generally, a stable improvement in T P is achieved on average. Similar results are obtained with k-means when all organizations are assigned to clusters. However, when we set a distance threshold, creating more consistent clusters, we observe fluctuations in T P R: as clusters get smaller much faster (in relation to k value), IP2IP starts outperforming intersection. This indicates that correlated attacks can improve knowledge of organizations and enhance their local predictions, especially in smaller clusters.
With k-NN, a different behavior is observed: for smaller clusters, IP2IP achieves higher T P R (up to 0.7 for k = 5) but, as clusters get bigger, intersection yields the best results (up to 0.77 for k = 35). Then, as DB-SCAN only builds large clusters, we observe fluctuations in T P R: for instance, intersection achieves 0.84 with one cluster, decreases to 0.77 with two clusters, and it increases again to 0.81 with three clusters. However, this fluctuation is not reflected by the T P impr -in fact, with two clusters, we actually obtain the best improvement (0.74 for IP2IP+intersection), likely due to the way organizations are split into clusters, rather than F N incr (which is steady and independent as shown in Figure 6(c) ). Increase/Improvement in TP/FP/FN. Table 5 shows that for all clustering algorithms, maximizing T P impr always leads to higher F P incr ranging from 1.51 of k-NN up to 5.86 of DBSCAN. Furthermore, we notice that the settings that maximize the F 1 score, T P R, and P P V , (when sharing intersection) also minimize F N incr , e.g. agglomerative with k = 1 achieves −0.53 F N incr . We also report the standard deviation of T P impr and F P incr , which provide an indication of the differences, in terms of "symmetry", of the benefits of collaboration-i.e., higher standard deviation shows that some organizations improve T P or increase F P much more than others.
Comparison to [36] . When comparing to Soldo et al. [36] 's techniques (cf. Section 4), we observe that they achieve a higher T P impr (0.95 vs 0.74 with DBSCAN, k = 2). However, our techniques outperform theirs in terms of recall (T P R) (e.g., with DBSCAN we reach 0.84 and with k-means 0.73, compared to their 0.66) as well as precision (0.23 with DBSCAN, k = 1 vs 0.08) and F 1 score (0.36, again with DBSCAN k = 1 vs 0.14). Even if we consider settings involving more collaborators compared to DBSCAN, we still obtain appreciably better scores -e.g. agglomerative with k = 15 and 700 collaborators achieves F 1 = 0.27, and k-means with 280 collaborators 0.30.
Scalability
As discussed above, our system involves four steps -(1) secure computation of pairwise similarity, (2) clustering, (3) secure data sharing within the clusters, and (4) time-series prediction -and to assess its scalability, we need to evaluate computation/communication complexity incurred by each step. Naturally, (1) and (3) dominate the complexities as they require running a number of cryptographic protocols (involving public-key crypto) depending on the number of organizations involved. In fact, clustering incurs a negligible overhead: on commodity hardware, to perform clustering with 1,000 organizations, it takes 6.1ms for k-means, 81ms for agglomerative and 5.2ms for k-NN (k = 2), and 6.3ms for DB-SCAN (eps = 0.2). Also, time-series EWMA prediction requires 4.6µs per IP, so it takes 4.6ms for 1,000 IPs.
As we compute pairwise similarity based on the amount of common attacks between two organizations, and support its secure computation via PSI-CA [11] , step (1) requires a number of protocol runs quadratic in the number of organizations. In our experiments (see details below), it takes 1.98s and 2.12MB bandwidth for one protocol execution, using 2048-bit moduli, with sets of size 4,000 (the average number of attacks observed by each organization). As for (3), i.e., secure within-cluster sharing of events related to common attacks (intersection), we rely on PSI-DT [12] , and it takes 1.24s and 2.18MB for a single execution with the same settings.
Send relevant Buff[·, ·] entries to organizations in the same cluster
(IP2IP is discussed later on). Therefore, complexities may quickly become prohibitive when several thousands of organizations are involved. Aiming to support full scalability, we now introduce a variant that supports secure computation of pairwise similarity as well as secure log sharing without a quadratic number of public-key operations and quadratic communication overhead.
Server-Aided PSI-CA and PSI-DT. Recall that our system relies on a semi-trusted authority, STA, for clustering and coordination, which is assumed to follow protocol specifications and not to collude with other organizations, therefore, we can actually use it to also help with secure computations.
Inspired by Kamara et al.'s server-aided PSI [20] , we extend our framework by replacing public-key cryptography operations with pseudo-random permutations (PRP), which we instantiate using AES. Specifically, we minimize interactions among pairs of organizations so that complexities incurred by each organization are constant in the number of organizations, while only imposing a minimal, linear communication overhead on STA. Our extension involves four phases: (1) setup, where, as in the Note that building the O2O matrix is actually optimized using hash tables (i.e., dense hash set and dense hash map from Sparehash [18] , as in [20] ). Also note that, since sets in our system are multi-sets, we concatenate counters to the IP address, so that the STA cannot tell which and how many IPs appear more than once.
A shortcoming of the PRP-based scheme is that if the STA colludes with a single organization, it can now decrypt all the datasets of all organizations. Whereas, using traditional PSI-CA/PSI-DT, collusion only leads to recovering a subset of datasets. Moreover, STA now also learns the size of each organization's dataset, however, we could have organizations pad their sets, by adding random entries, up to a fixed size.
Experimental Evaluation. To fully grasp the scalability of the server-aided extension, and compare it to using "traditional" PSI-CA and PSI-DT, we report execution times for increasing number of participating organizations. We benchmark the performance of PSI-CA [12] and PSI-DT [12] using 2048-bit moduli, by modifying the OpenSSL/GMP based C implementation by De Cristofaro et al. [13] , as well as the PRP-based scheme presented above and inspired by Kamara et al.'s work [20] . Experiments are run using two 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 CPUs with 8GB of RAM connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet link.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) plot computation and communication complexities incurred by an individual organization vis-á-vis the total number of organizations involved the system, while Figure 7 (c) reports the communication overhead introduced on the STA-side for the PRP scheme. Observe that complexities for PSI-CA/PSI-DT protocols on each organization grow linearly in the number of organizations (hence, quadratic overall). When 10,000 organizations are involved, it would take about 3 hours per organization, each transmitting 10GB, to execute. Whereas, the PRP-based scheme incurs constant complexities on each organization (57.6ms and 120KB) and an appreciably low communication overhead on the STA (about 1GB) for 10,000 organizations.
IP2IP.
We also evaluate the IP2IP sharing method in our methodology, whereby organizations interact with STA in order to discover cluster-wide correlated attacks. Assuming clusters of 100 organizations and an IP2IP matrix of (2 24 · 2 24 )/2 (recall from Section 5.2 that we consider the whole /24 IP space), we measure a 2.7s running time per organization with 41KB of bandwidth as well as a 0.07s overhead on the STA with 4.1MB bandwidth. Recall that we use the private Count-Min sketch based implementation by Melis et al. [26] , which results in the private aggregation of 10,336 elements. Note that, even if clusters are bigger than 100, as detailed in [26] , one can still perform private aggregation on multiple subgroups (e.g., of size 100) without endangering organizations' privacy.
Conclusion
This paper presented a scalable privacy-friendly approach to building highly predictive blacklists, whereby a semi-trusted authority clusters similar organizations based on the similarity of their attack logs, without re-ceiving these logs in the clear. Entities in the same cluster then share, again in a privacy-preserving way, relevant logs with each other, and can build more accurate predictive blacklists. We present a comprehensive set of measurements as we experiment with prior work as well as with four different clustering algorithms and three privacy-preserving sharing strategies, using real-world alerts collected from DShield.org. Our results show that previously proposed (non privacy-preserving) centralized algorithms [36] introduce a large number of false positives and false negatives, thus resulting in poor accuracy (a fact which was overlooked in prior work), and that our privacy-friendly techniques markedly outperform them.
As part of future work, we plan to experiment with other prediction algorithms and evaluate similar strategies to different collaborative security problems, such as spam filtering and malware detection. communication and computational complexities linear in the size of the sets: parties need to exchange O(v + w) group items, and compute O(v + w) modular exponentiations with short exponents. Similar to PSI, in the semihonest model, two executions of PSI-CA with inverted roles yield a mutual PSI-CA where both parties learn the cardinality of the set intersection.
PSI with Data Transfer (PSI-DT): a cryptographic protocol between server and client on input, respectively, S = {(s 1 , data 1 ) . . . , (s w , data w )} and C = {c 1 , . . . , c v }. At the end, the client obtains {(s i , data i | ∃ c j s.t. s i = c j }. In other words, the client not only learns which items are in the intersection, but also gets related data records.
Special purpose protocols for PSI-DT have been proposed [12, 15] , but we do not know of any available garbled circuits based instantiation. Hence, we use the PSI-DT protocol described in [12] , secure in the Random Oracle Model under the One-More RSA assumption in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. It incurs communication and computational complexities linear in the size of the sets: parties need to exchange O(v + w) group items, and compute O(w) RSA-CRT exponentiations and O(v) modular multiplications if one picks a small RSA public exponent (e.g., 3 or 17).
Once again, in the semi-honest model, two executions of PSI-DT with inverted roles trivially yield a mutual PSI-DT where both parties learn the intersection.
Efficient Private Recommendation via Succinct Sketches [26] . A privacy-friendly recommender system based on Item-KNN [34] has been introduced by Melis et al. [26] . . Their construction involves a "tally" server (the BBC in their application example) and a set of users (visitors of BBC's broadcasting site iPlayer). The main goal of their system is to train the recommender system using only aggregate statistics. Specifically, they build a global matrix of co-views (i.e., pairs of programs watched by the same user) in a privacy-preserving way, by relying on (i) private data aggregation based on secret sharing (inspired by [23] ), and (ii) Count-Min sketches [9] to reduce the computation/communication overhead from linear to logarithmic in the size of the matrix, trading off an upper-bounded error with increased efficiency.
If M denotes the number of items (e.g., the programs on iPlayer in their application, or the number of IP addresses in ours), the compact representation of the IP2IP through the Count-Min Sketch has size O(log(M * M/2)). More precisely, given parameters ( , δ), the Count-Min Sketch is a matrix of size L = d × w where d = ln (M * M )/(2 * δ) and w = e/ . Melis et al. [26] set = δ = 0.01, yielding, e.g., L = 4, 896 for M = 1, 000, and L = 10, 336 for M = 2 24 . The parameters ( , δ) give an upper bounded error for the estimated countersĉ i amounting toĉ i ≤ c i + j |c j | with probability 1 − δ, where c i is the true element. As demonstrated empirically by Melis et al. [26] , the error ultimately introduces a negligible impact on the accuracy of the aggregation as well as the recommendation. Finally, the computational overhead introduced by the cryptographic operations for private aggregation, as demonstrated experimentally in [26] , are in the order of seconds even with thousands of items.
B Clustering Algorithms
Agglomerative Clustering. Hierarchical Clustering algorithms build nested clusters by merging or splitting them successively. The hierarchy is represented as a tree, with the root being the unique cluster that gathers all the samples, and the leaves those with only one sample. Agglomerative clustering performs hierarchical clustering using a bottom-up approach: each observation starts in its own cluster, and clusters are successively merged together. Different linkage criteria determine the actual metric used to merge, e.g., average linkage minimizes the average distance between all observations of pairs of clusters, while complete linkage minimizes the maximum distance between the observations of pairs of clusters.
k-means. k-means clustering separates samples in groups of equal variance, minimizing inertia or withincluster sum of squares. The k-means algorithm requires the number of clusters to be specified as it divides a set of N samples X into k disjoint clusters C, each described by the mean µ j of the samples in the cluster. The means are commonly called the cluster "centroids" and the algorithm chooses centroids that minimize n i=0 min µj ∈C (||x j − µ i || 2 ). The algorithm includes three steps: (1) choosing the initial centroids, often by choosing k samples from X; (2) assigning each sample to its nearest centroid; and (3) creating new centroids by taking the mean value of all samples assigned to each previous centroid. The algorithm loops between (2) and (3) until the difference between the old and the new centroids is below a threshold.
k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). k-NN is a simple machine learning algorithm that finds a predefined number of training samples closest in distance to a new sample. The number of samples can be a user-defined constant and the distance can be any metric measure: standard Euclidean distance is the most common choice. In Section 5, we employ unsupervised k-NN to identify, for each organization, its most similar ones. DBSCAN. Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN), given a set of points in some space, groups together points that are closely packed together (points with many nearby neighbors), marking as outliers points that lie alone in low density regions. The central component to DBSCAN are core samples, i.e., samples in areas of high density. A cluster is a set of core samples, each close to each other (measured by some distance measure) and a set of non-core samples that are close to a core sample (but are not themselves core samples). There are two parameters of the algorithm, min samples and eps, defining density. Higher min samples or lower eps indicate higher density necessary to form a cluster. In other words, a core sample is defined such that there exist min samples other samples within a distance of eps. A cluster is a set of core samples, and is built by recursively taking a core sample, finding all its neighbors that are core samples, and so on. Figure 8 reports the average size of the clusters as well as the total number of collaborators involved in them with each clustering algorithm and various k values, as discussed in Section 5.2. Agglomerative clustering assigns all organizations to clusters (700 collaborators in total) with the average cluster size decreasing as k increases. When setting a cluster distance threshold, k-means yields a linear increase in the total number of collaborators up to 480 (k = 35) and the average cluster size decreases faster than agglomerative, in relation to k. k-NN with strong clusters involves between 220 and 320 collaborators and the average cluster size grows linearly in k (cluster sizes range from 1 to 14). Finally, for DBSCAN, the total number of collaborators peaks at 210 when it builds two clusters of average size 21.1.
C Cluster Sizes
